Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons by Sinhababu, Neil
Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons
Neil Sinhababu – neiladri@gmail.com – National University of Singapore
Forthcoming in Perspectives on Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, Oxford University Press
This essay is about how virtuous people recognize moral reasons for action. My 
opponent is John McDowell, who argues in "Virtue and Reason" that virtuous people 
recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire.1 His 
arguments are influential against Humean views on which desire makes us see 
considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons.2 I'll show that a Humean view better 
explains the phenomena McDowell cites against it than his own view can. 
First, I'll present McDowell's position, on which moral reasons are perceived 
through perceptual capacities that don't include desire. Second, I'll show how the 
salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, 
exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. Third, I'll describe how 
Humean views can account for virtuous people's ability to consistently recognize and 
follow uncodifiable rules of commonsense morality. Fourth, I'll explain why moral 
considerations can silence other considerations when virtuous people deliberate: 
knowing that one won't get something prevents one from weighing it in deliberation. 
I'll conclude by arguing that animals can be virtuous by having the right desires. 
1. McDowell on perception of moral reasons
This section lays out McDowell's view of how virtuous people recognize moral reasons 
using a distinctive sensitivity or perceptual capacity that doesn't involve desire.
McDowell writes, 
...reliably kind behaviour is not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or 
instinct, like the courageous behaviour – so called only by courtesy – of a lioness 
defending her cubs. Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behavior is 
(one way of formulating) his reason for behaving that way, on each of the 
relevant occasions. So it must be something of which, on each of the relevant 
occasions, he is aware. A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of 
requirement that situations impose on behaviour. The deliverances of a reliable 
sensitivity are cases of knowledge, and there are idioms according to which the 
sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person 
knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The 
sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity. (51)
1 John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason", in Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1998.
2 "Virtue and Reason" is widely cited for its arguments against Humean views. See, for instance, Connie 
S. Rosati, "Moral Motivation," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Zalta, ed., 2006; Christian 
Miller, "Motivational Internalism", Philosophical Studies 139, 2008, 233-255; and Rebecca Kukla and 
Mark Lance, Yo! and Lo!: The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. For Humean responses, see Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998; Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 
and Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
My forthcoming A Treatise of Humean Nature develops a broad psychological picture answering 
objections of this kind. 
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He takes perceptual capacities like this to explain how virtuous people recognize moral 
reasons in deliberation and act on them.
McDowell rejects Humean accounts of how virtuous people recognize moral 
reasons, writing that explaining the virtuous person's recognition of reasons in terms of 
a "non-cognitive extra that would be analogous to hunger" (70) is "highly implausible" 
(71). On this Humean view, "What a virtuous person really perceives is... a 
straightforward fact about the situation at hand, which – as the objection requires – 
would be incapable of eliciting action on its own" (57). The motivational force comes 
from a further hunger-like non-cognitive attitude, not the perceptual state, which can't 
cause action. One perceives that others will suffer unless helped. Being kind, one desires 
that others not suffer. The motivational force that drives one to help is provided by the 
desire, and merely channeled in a particular direction by the perceptual state, which 
carries the information that a sufferer could be helped. This view allows an unkind 
person to have the same perceptual state without being moved to help, because the 
desire is missing.
McDowell claims that desire isn't part of the capacity to perceive salient reasons, 
writing that "The most natural way to press the objection is to insist on purifying the 
content of what is genuinely known down to something that is, in itself, motivationally 
inert...and then to represent the 'perception' of a salience as an amalgam of the purified 
awareness with an additional appetitive state (70)." He rejects this option unless the 
appetitive state is an entire conception of how to live, which he repeatedly distinguishes 
from ordinary desires. On his view, "perceptions of saliences resist decomposition into 
"pure" awareness together with appetitive states" (71). 
McDowell's other work further develops arguments against Humean views on 
which desire is essential for practical reasoning and action. In "Noncognitivism and 
Rule-Following", he criticizes "a philosophy of mind that insists on a strict separation 
between cognitive capacities and their exercise, on the one hand, and what eighteenth-
century writers would classify as passions and sentiments, on the other" (200).3 He 
criticizes Hume as a proponent of this view (213). McDowell's "Are Moral Requirements 
Hypothetical Imperatives?" also rejects the Humean view that virtuous agents' reasons 
come from "first, a neutral conception of the facts, available equally to someone who 
sees no reason to act in the way in question, and second, a desire, which combines with 
that conception of the facts to make the action attractive to its possessor" (82). He argues 
that they instead come from "special ways of seeing situations" (84).4
2. Desire and the recognition of reasons
This section responds to McDowell by arguing that a Humean view better explains 
what it's like for the virtuous person to recognize moral reasons. 
McDowell doesn't illustrate the phenomenology of recognizing moral reasons in 
detail, so I'll compare how a hungry person who sees some ripe strawberries thinks 
about eating them with how a kind person who sees a pedestrian whose leg has been 
broken in an accident thinks about helping him. Since McDowell specifically rejects 
3 John McDowell, "Noncognitivism and Rule-Following", in Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998.
4 John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?", in Mind, Value, and Reality,  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
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explaining recognition of moral reasons using a hunger-like mental state, this example 
lets us test his claims. While it's obvious that both hunger and kindness can motivate 
action, they have broad phenomenological similarities. Hunger and kindness similarly 
affect how agents direct their attention, feel pleasure, and are affected by vivid 
representations of food or suffering. This phenomenological evidence suggests that a 
desire that others not suffer drives the kind person's recognition of reasons to help 
someone, just as a desire to eat drives the hungry person's recognition of reasons to eat 
something.
First, hunger and kindness similarly direct attention.5 The hungry person's 
attention will be directed towards the strawberries, just as the kind person's attention 
will be directed towards the injured man. If it's obvious how to get the strawberries and 
eat them, perhaps by buying them, the hungry person will quickly think of that. And if 
it's obvious how to help the injured man, perhaps by calling an ambulance, the kind 
person will quickly think of that. In more complicated situations where the hungry 
person has to find cash or the kind person has to find a pay phone to call the 
ambulance, they'll attend to possible ways to find cash or pay phones. Hunger and 
kindness direct attention away from things irrelevant to the objects of desire. Neither 
hungry people nor kind people in these situations will attend to whether birds are 
singing or whether their hair looks nice. Full people and callous people, who lack the 
relevant desires, attend to different things. Full people might ignore the strawberries or 
reflect on the evolutionary processes that created them, while callous people might 
ignore the injured man or consider robbing him.
Second, similar kinds of information create pleasant and unpleasant emotions in 
hungry and kind people. The hungry person will become impatient if the line to buy the 
strawberries moves slowly, while the kind person will become impatient if she has to 
turn her phone on to call the ambulance and it takes a long time to start up. The hungry 
person will feel displeased if the strawberries can only be bought with a currency she 
doesn't have, just as the kind person will feel displeased if her phone isn't getting 
reception and she can't make the call.6 Meanwhile, a full person won't feel any 
particular emotion upon learning that the strawberries aren't for sale, and a callous 
person won't care whether her phone gets reception at that time, unless it's important 
for some selfish purpose. 
Third, the more vividly the strawberries' deliciousness is represented, the 
stronger all these effects on the hungry person's perception and motivation will be, just 
as the more vividly the pedestrian's suffering is represented, the stronger these effects 
on the kind person's perception and motivation will be. If the hungry person can 
directly see the luscious redness of the strawberries, that'll be more attention-grabbing, 
productive of emotion, and motivating than if they're in packaging that doesn't allow 
for clear vision. (People selling food often try to motivate customers to make purchases 
by making delicious aspects of the food vivid to them.) Hearing the injured man's 
piteous moans will affect a kind person even more strongly than seeing him moaning 
outside a window that blocks the sound. Even with one's beliefs about the situation 
fixed, more vivid sensory representations will, in Hume's words, make one's passions 
5 This property of desire is discussed in Neil Sinhababu, "The Humean Theory of Motivation 
Reformulated and Defended," Philosophical Review 118:4, 465-500, 2009.
6 These hedonic effects are grounded in neural connections between regions where desire and pleasure 
are localized. Timothy Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
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more violent. These changes in the vividness with which the strawberries or the 
pedestrian are represented, however, won't make much difference to the full person or 
the callous person. 
Other virtues exhibit desire's effects just as kindness does. Just people notice that 
particular courses of action would involve acting unjustly and are more displeased 
when they more vividly imagine themselves doing these actions. Honest people will 
notice that particular utterances would be lies, while truly dishonest people may not 
care enough to notice. When other moral considerations give honest people no choice 
but to lie, the experience of telling the lie is unpleasant for them, while it isn't for 
dishonest people.7
Alison Hills' essay in this volume argues that cognitivist views like McDowell's 
do better in allowing the virtuous person's moral understanding to "mirror the world" 
in representing the moral facts and the relations between them.8 First, if we believe that 
we should avert suffering, our beliefs mirror the moral fact that suffering should be 
averted. Second, if we believe that we should avert suffering, so we should end the Iraq 
War, so we should vote for Democrats, our beliefs mirror the structural relations 
between moral facts. As a cognitivist about moral judgment, I agree with Hills that true 
moral belief should be in the picture.9
But if virtuous character is constituted by desire, its motivational structure can 
still match the moral facts. If I desire that suffering be averted, my desires match the 
moral facts. And if I want to vote for Democrats, because I want the Iraq War to end, 
because I want to avert suffering, the structure of my desires matches the structural 
relations between moral facts. This matching is desiderative rather than alethic, since 
desires can't be true as beliefs are. But desires can move us to think, feel, and act in ways 
that favor their objects. These properties may be even better than truth for constituting 
virtuous dispositions that properly fit the world. 
McDowell's defenders might suggest three differences between how hungry and 
kind people see reasons. First, kind people see suffering as bad and are averse to it, 
while hungry people see food as good and positively desire to eat it. This is why kind 
people would be relieved to learn that the injured person was just an actor pretending 
to be injured, while hungry people would be disappointed to learn that the strawberries 
are fake. And it's why kind people don't create suffering to relieve it, while hungry 
people would be delighted to quickly create strawberries and eat them. This difference 
in types of desire also gives rise to different pleasant and unpleasant emotions – 
disappointment in one case versus horror in the other. But these differences don't 
suggest that the kind person has a completely different type of mental state. The family 
of desires includes members that generate somewhat different emotions, like thirst and 
sexual lust. Kind people's attitudes toward suffering are aversions. Aversions typically 
direct attention, generate hedonically charged emotions, and respond to vividness, just 
7 An extreme case is provided by psychopaths, who frequently tell lies without feeling any negative 
emotions about doing so. For the classic study, see H. M. Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity, Augusta: Emily 
M. Cleckley, 1988. More recent research is covered in Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
8 Alison Hills, "Virtue and Cognition".
9 The Humean, cognitivist, and externalist picture I favor is defended by naturalistic realists like Peter 
Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity," Social Philosophy and Policy, 7:1 151-174, 1989. Chapter 4 of A 
Treatise of Humean Nature describes how feelings generated by desire cause us to form moral beliefs.
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as desires do.10 Examples include fear of bodily injury, disgust at excreta, and fear of 
snakes. These aversions lead us to see their objects as bad, as the kind person regards 
suffering. Following Richard Brandt, Humeans can regard character traits as constituted 
by desires of either the positive or aversive kind. All these desires can make reasons 
phenomenologically salient, and lead us to recognize and act on them.11
A second difference may be that full bellies and rising blood glucose levels stop 
hunger, while it's harder to identify similar physiological factors that stop kindness. 
Since hunger existed in psychologically simpler beings for a very long time, a 
physiological regulation system evolved around it, while nothing similar has happened 
with kindness. Many human desires, like those for money and victory, lack such 
physiological regulation systems. Athletes and chess players don't say things like "I just 
won. I'll probably want to win again in four hours, but I'm fine with losing until then." 
So even if kindness is unlike hunger in this regard, it's still a member of the Humean 
family.12
A third difference concerns the objectivity of morality, which differs sharply from 
the subjectivity of deliciousness. Morality is typically understood as applying to all 
agents, while foods are delicious only to those who desire them. I agree that morality is 
objective while deliciousness is subjective. But this claim doesn't seem to be supported 
by any robust feature of moral phenomenology, and doesn't support a psychological 
distinction between the processes by which morality and deliciousness are detected. I 
see the objectivity of morality as grounded in the structure of moral concepts 
themselves, not in any phenomenological difference from deliciousness. If there is a 
phenomenological difference that supports the objectivity of morality, “Virtue and 
Reason” leaves it unnamed. 
Even if McDowell were to tell us more about how his perceptual capacity 
explains the full phenomenology of kindness, the Humean account would be more 
elegant. Humeans explain how the kind person recognizes reasons using an appetitive 
state (desire) and pure awareness (representations of the non-normative facts). 
McDowell instead invokes motivation from a perceptual capacity that doesn't include 
desire. But he still invokes desire to account for hunger. So a Humean theory that 
doesn't invoke his distinctive perceptual capacity for perceiving reasons without desire 
provides a simpler total account of our practical phenomenology and behavior. To 
explain how we recognize reasons when presented with representations of the non-
normative facts across the whole range of cases, he uses desire for cases like hunger and 
a special perceptual capacity for cases like kindness where Humeans use desire for all 
cases. We should invoke additional entities or processes only to explain additional data. 
Desire explains the phenomenology of recognizing reasons so well that we don't need 
McDowell's perceptual capacity.
3. Uncodifiability and consistency
This section describes how Humeans can account for the uncodifiability of 
commonsense morality and our ability to consistently follow its norms.
10 For more on the psychology and neuroscience of positive desire and aversion, see Schroeder.
11 Richard Brandt, "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," American Philosophical Quarterly, 7:1 23-
37, 1970.
12 Cases of empathy fatigue among professional caregivers might suggest that kindness is in fact like 
hunger in this regard, supporting the analogy between them. I thank Iskra Fileva for noting this. 
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McDowell advances a particularist view on which any moral theory composed of 
just a few simple principles won't fit the rich and complex picture of morality that 
virtuous people see, using their capacity to recognize moral reasons. He rejects the view 
that that "the virtuous person's views about how, in general, one should behave are 
susceptible of codification", arguing that "to an unprejudiced eye it should seem quite 
implausible that any reasonably adult moral outlook admits of any such codification" 
(58). I don't know whether McDowell is claiming that Humeans can't explain this. But 
I'll make it clear that Humeans can.
The uncodifiability of commonsense morality arises from the complexity and 
multiplicity of our moral desires. We find it morally desirable for a variety of outcomes 
to obtain, and for ourselves to be to be in a wide variety of relations to these outcomes, 
giving us a complicated moral outlook. Codifying sexual desirability is difficult for 
similar reasons. Many different desires sexually attract us to people, and they often 
point in different directions, giving us a complicated sexual outlook. Just as we desire a 
wide variety of morally significant events to happen and desire to be in diverse agential 
and causal relations with them, we desire our lovers to have a wide range of physical 
and psychological properties and relations to us and other things. I couldn't produce a 
set of rules to rank the desirability of all people to me, or pick out which action I find 
intuitively right in each situation. It's similarly difficult to give a full and substantive 
account of what makes food delicious or art beautiful. In all these areas, neatly 
codifiable rules won't fit our intuitive evaluations because our desires are so many and 
so complex.
McDowell also argues that his distinctive perceptual capacity explains how we 
can consistently act morally when so many different ways of acting are available. 
Following Wittgenstein, he notes that while we find it natural to continue the sequence 
2, 4, 6, 8...  after 1000 with 1002, 1004..., there are infinitely many possible continuations, 
including 1004, 1008.... A perceptual capacity that leads us to see the former pattern as 
more natural could explain why we see continuing with 1002 as the natural thing to do. 
Similarly, on his view, virtuous people's judgments of when to act are grounded in their 
common and stable "conception of the sort of life a human being ought to lead" (66-67). 
This conception arises from "the virtuous person's distinctive way of viewing particular 
situations" (71). 
Desire can also explain such consistent behavior, whether or not the behavior fits 
our conception of how we ought to live. Desire moves people to pursue food, sex, 
drugs, and procrastination in consistent, patterned, predictable ways even if they judge 
this behavior inconsistent with the lives they ought to lead. If desires conflicting with 
our values explain consistent patterns of behavior that conflict with how we think we 
ought to live, desires according with our values will explain consistent patterns of 
behavior that accord with how we think we ought to live. Desires explain behavior, and 
stable desires will explain consistent behavior. In explaining how virtuous people 
consistently act morally, invoking common and stable desires seems no worse than 
invoking a perceptual capacity.
4. Silencing reasons
This section addresses how considerations can be silenced in practical deliberation. 
McDowell claims that the phenomenology of silencing can only be explained if 
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recognizing moral reasons is part of a perceptual capacity independent of desire. I'll 
explain why McDowell sees silencing as troublesome for Humeans, and provide a 
Humean account of silencing on which our knowledge that we won't act to attain 
something prevents us from weighing it in deliberation. 
McDowell regards Humean views as unable to fully explain how considerations 
tempting virtuous people away from virtuous action can be silenced. He illustrates his 
objection with Aristotle's distinction between virtue and continence, discussing the 
temptation to run away in the face of danger. The continent person weighs the reasons 
to behave courageously against the reasons to run away, and behaves courageously 
because he regards the reasons to do so as superior. The truly virtuous person is 
different:
The distinction becomes intelligible if we stop assuming that the virtuous 
person's judgment is a result of balancing reasons for and against. The view of a 
situation that he arrives at by exercising his sensitivity is one in which some 
aspect of the situation is seen as as constituting a reason for acting in some way; 
this reason is apprehended, not as outweighing or overriding any reasons for 
acting in other ways, which would otherwise be constituted by other aspects of 
the situation (the present danger, say) but as silencing them. Here and now the 
risk to life and limb is not seen as any reason for removing himself. (55-56)
The virtuous person sees things this way despite desiring to survive as much as anyone 
else does. McDowell claims that on Humean views, the virtuous person would just be 
weighing escape against courageous action. But instead of weighing the reasons 
favoring both options, and choosing courageous action as the continent person does or 
running away as the incontinent person does, the reason to escape is silenced and not 
weighed in the virtuous person. The question of how this kind of silencing is 
psychologically possible, McDowell claims, "clearly is answerable, if at all, only by 
supposing that the incontinent or continent person does not fully share the virtuous 
person's perception of the situation" (56). McDowell thus takes the phenomenon of 
silencing to demonstrate the inadequacy of Humean views, and the need for a further 
perceptual element in the recognition of reasons.13 
McDowell challenges Humeans to explain why we don't have the experience of 
balancing the silenced consideration against other things we desire. It instead seems to 
be excluded from deliberation. We might feel wistful about it if it's a good thing we can't 
achieve, or resigned if it's a bad thing we can't avoid. We'll still be pleased if other 
things favor achieving the silenced consideration and we can act on it. But it won't seem 
like a reason for acting. If treating the recognition of reasons as an effect of desire entails 
that we must experience all considerations as having weights corresponding to our 
desires for them, silencing is a counterexample to the Humean view. I agree with 
McDowell that considerations are often silenced rather than weighed in deliberation. So 
13 McDowell expresses this point about the norms in "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives?": "the dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with other reasons at 
all, not even on a scale that always tips on their side. If a situation in which virtue imposes a 
requirement is genuinely conceived as such, according to this view, then considerations that, in the 
absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons for acting otherwise are silenced 
altogether – not overridden – by the requirement." (91). 
7
I'll present a Humean explanation of why these considerations are silenced. 
Considerations are silenced when knowing that we won't pursue them prevents 
us from weighing them. Consider the phenomenological similarities between silenced 
considerations and goals we won't achieve because of external obstacles. In a case of 
silencing, I might not be able to go to a fun party because the university requires me to 
administer an exam that evening. While I could blow off my exam-proctoring 
responsibility if I really wanted to, leaving my confused students with no exam to take, 
I know I'm responsible enough not to do that. Since I know that my motivational 
structure doesn't allow me to go to the party, I can only regard it wistfully. I'll appreciate 
its value, but not weigh going as a course of action. I'll feel similarly about the party if I 
learn about it while I'm on another continent and there's no way to travel there in time. 
The limits of early 21st century transportation, not my motivational structure, stop me 
from attending parties on other continents. But either way, I can only regard the party 
wistfully, and I won't weigh it in deliberation. 
Moral and prudential considerations can be silenced too, suggesting that 
considering them involves the same mental state types as considering other reasons. 
Many people recognize that eating meat causes animal suffering, and recognize that 
animal suffering is bad, but continue to eat meat without any experience of weighing. 
When I was like this, I didn't weigh the welfare of animals against the deliciousness of 
sausage, even when thinking of the animal suffering involved. I was like the person 
who Aristotle describes as not weighing danger in his deliberation, with the moral 
valence reversed. When longtime smokers are reminded of the dangers of smoking 
before they smoke, a similar thing can happen – they'll be resigned to the bad 
consequences of their actions, rather than actively weighing them. Since silencing can 
go both ways, we shouldn't treat recognition of moral reasons as involving a mental 
state with special silencing power that desires lack. Treating all recognition of practical 
reasons as coming from desire explains why moral, prudential, and immoral reasons 
can silence each other.
Considerations are silenced when we know we won't attain them, either because 
of the uncooperative world outside or contrary motivations within. Some 
considerations we could attain are silenced rather than weighed because we know we 
won't pursue them, not because some non-Humean component of reasoning silences 
desires opposing moral action. Humean views can easily accommodate our not 
weighing something in deliberation because we know that things outside us make it 
unachievable. I suggest that they can similarly accommodate our not weighing 
something because we know that things inside us prevent us from achieving it. 
Silencing fits neatly into a Humean picture of motivation and deliberation. In using 
additional deliberative processes to explain it, McDowell unnecessarily complicates 
psychology. 
5. Mammalian moral psychology
I'll conclude by returning to McDowell's distinction between the virtuous person and 
the lioness defending her cubs. Kindness and courage, on McDowell's view, don't come 
out of "blind, non-rational habit or instinct" as the lioness' behavior does. On my view, 
kind humans and courageous lionesses both act out of desire, the same kind of mental 
state that motivates hungry humans and lionesses to eat. Does this psychological 
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similarity between humans and lionesses mean that humans are merely animals, 
incapable of moral agency and virtue?
I draw the opposite conclusion: animals with the right desires have morally 
virtuous character.14 There's much debate about what kinds of desires are required for 
virtue. On Thomas Hurka's view, they need to desire morally good things and be averse 
to morally bad things.15 On Julia Driver's view, they need to have mental states that 
systematically produce good consequences.16 On either view, having the right desires is 
sufficient for virtuous character, and an animal with the right desires would be 
virtuous.17
Ordinary folk accept this conclusion, rejecting the philosophical dogma that 
animals can't be moral agents. Read news stories about the mother dog who rescued her 
puppies from a burning building, or watch videos about animals helping each other, 
and you'll often see the commenters pouring out moral praise for the animals (and 
wishing that more humans had moral character as good as these animals).18
Aristotle wrote before we understood our evolutionary kinship with the beasts. 
Contemporary philosophers don't have his excuse for thinking that human motivation 
involves fundamentally different psychological processes than animal motivation. Our 
models of human and animal motivation should be as similar as the data allow, 
respecting the continuities that one would expect to find across mammalian psychology. 
Where behavior and phenomenology differ, we should posit differences. But otherwise, 
we should prefer psychological models that treat humans and animals as similarly as 
possible.
The common mother of the dog, the lioness, and I walked the earth in very old 
times. But a mother's desire that her offspring be safe and content may be older still. 
And if it is, maternal love may well be the oldest of the virtues. I'm not above praising a 
dog for his loyalty, or a lioness for her maternal love. They're my brother and sister, 
descended from a common mother who lived long ago. I'm capable of many of their 
vices, and they're capable of many of my virtues. We are kin. 
14 Arpaly and Schroeder write, "having the right desires is what makes a person morally virtuous", and 
nothing in their view prevents this from extending to animals too. (16)
15 Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
16 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
17 For a defense of this conclusion, see Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral?, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012.
18 For representative examples, see "Incredible photos of heroic mother dog carrying her ten-day-old 
puppies from a blazing home to safety", http://bit.ly/XyzNJT; "Hero Dog Tries to Help Wounded 
Dog - Chile", http://bit.ly/TqV9. The highest-rated comment is, "It's official. Dogs have more morality 
now than humans."
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